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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NOS. 43426 & 43427 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) CANYON COUNTY NOS. CR 2013-10940 & 
v.     ) CR 2015-5335 
     ) 
FRANCISCO ARTEAGA LOPEZ, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Francisco Lopez appeals contending the district court abused its discretion when 
it imposed and executed his sentences in these cases rather than retaining jurisdiction.  
He also contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for 
sentence reduction.  Specifically, he contends the district court failed to sufficiently 
consider rehabilitation as an objective in its decision, and it also did not sufficiently 
consider the mitigating factors present in this case.  In either case, this Court should 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or, alternatively, remand the case for a 
new sentencing determination. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Lopez has struggled in dealing with his alcohol dependence.  For example, 
he informed the presentence investigator that he had tried to get into treatment 
programs, but he was unable to afford that treatment on his own and was unable to get 
financial assistance.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.19.)1  
However, he noted that, when he is able to maintain his sobriety, he is able to maintain 
gainful employment.  (PSI, p.16.)  He also suffers from symptoms of major depression.  
(PSI, pp.57, 81.)  Nevertheless, these two cases constituted Mr. Lopez’s first felony 
convictions, though he had a history of misdemeanor charges.  (PSI, pp.4-12.) 
 In the two cases at issue here, Mr. Lopez’s continuing struggles resulted in 
charges for driving while intoxicated (DUI).  In the first case, the 2013 case, Mr. Lopez 
was charged with DUI with an enhancement for multiple prior DUI convictions.  
(R., pp.26-29.)  Mr. Lopez entered a plea agreement whereby he would plead guilty as 
charged on the DUI and a misdemeanor charge of open container, with the remaining 
misdemeanor charges to be dismissed.  (11/14/13 Tr., p.4, L.14 - p.5, L.1.)2  There 
were no recommendations for sentencing.  (See 11/14/13 Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.5, L.1; 
R., pp.39-40.)  However, Mr. Lopez failed to appear at the subsequent sentencing 
hearing.  (R., p.52.) 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
“Lopez Exhibits #43426.”  Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents 
attached thereto (police reports, substance abuse evaluations, etc.). 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, transcript citations will be to the volume containing the 
transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on June 2, 2015, and the sentencing 
hearing held on June 12, 2015.  
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 Mr. Lopez was subsequently arrested on a failure to appear warrant at the same 
time he was arrested in the second case, the 2015 case.  (See R., p.57 (certification of 
warrant return); R., pp.100-01 (the Information in the 2015 case)).  In the 2015 case, 
Mr. Lopez was charged with aggravated DUI based on the allegation that, while driving 
under the influence, he hit a pedestrian causing great bodily harm.  (R., pp.100-01.)  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Lopez agreed to plead as charged and, in exchange, 
the State would dismiss the associated misdemeanor charges, and it agreed to not file 
any additional charges in the 2015 case.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.18-20.)  The State also agreed to 
limit its sentencing recommendation to no more than three and one-half years fixed 
time.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.20-23.)  At the ensuing hearing, Mr. Lopez informed the district court 
that he was on misdemeanor probation in Utah.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.13-16.) 
 The presentence evaluations recommended Mr. Lopez participate in intensive 
outpatient treatment as to address his alcohol issues.  (PSI, pp.67, 79.)  A mental health 
evaluation also recommended counselling and medication to help Mr. Lopez deal with 
symptoms of depression.  (PSI, p.81.)  To allow him the opportunity to get that sort of 
treatment, the presentence investigator recommended that the district court retain 
jurisdiction so that Mr. Lopez might participate in a rider program.  (PSI, p.22.)   
 The prosecutor recognized that a period of retained jurisdiction might be 
appropriate for Mr. Lopez, but, in light of the particular facts surrounding the 2015 
charge, decided to recommend that the district court execute the sentence instead.  
(Tr., p.22, Ls.6-11.)  Mr. Lopez’s attorney pointed out that the presentence investigator 
considered the facts of both cases, and still determined the best sentencing option, 
“[b]ased on the level of assessed need and risk, and other protective factors as 
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discussed above,” was a period of retained jurisdiction.  (PSI, p.22; Tr., p.28, 
L.24 - p.29, L.6.)  Mr. Lopez also expressed his remorse, apologized to the victim from 
the 2015 case and her family, and accepted responsibility for his actions.  (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.1-6.) 
 Nevertheless, the district court determined Mr. Lopez “is too much of a risk . . . 
even to consider for a retained jurisdiction program.”  (Tr., p.31, L.25 - p.32, L.2.)  
Therefore, it imposed and executed a unified sentence of seven years, with three years 
fixed, in the 2013 case, and a concurrent unified sentence of ten years, with four years 
fixed, in the 2015 case.  (Tr., p.32, L.24 - p.33, L.25.)  Mr. Lopez filed a notice of appeal 
timely from both judgments of conviction.  (R., pp.132-34.) 
 At the same time, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the sentences in both 
cases.  (R., pp.139-43.)  In that motion, he argued that the district court had not 
given sufficient consideration to various mitigating factors present in his case.  
(R., pp.139-43.)  The district court denied that motion, pointing out that Mr. Lopez had a 
significant misdemeanor record and was reportedly not cooperative with the 
presentence process.  (R., pp.75, 149.) 
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ISSUES 
I. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed 
Mr. Lopez’s sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction.  
 
II. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Lopez’s motion 
for sentence reduction. 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Lopez’s 
Sentence Rather Than Retaining Jurisdiction 
 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:  (1) protection of society; 
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  State v. Charboneau, 
124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  The protection of society is the primary objective the court 
should consider.  Id.  Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also accomplishes 
the other objectives will be considered reasonable.  Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 
568 (Ct. App. 1982).  This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of 
the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing.  
Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
also held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition 
of the criminal sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on 
other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015). 
The presentence investigator recognized that, despite the facts of both cases, 
rehabilitation was still a viable option in Mr. Lopez’s case:  “Based on the level of 
assessed need and risk, and other protective factors as discussed above, Mr. Lopez 
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appears to be a good candidate for an order of retained jurisdiction.”  (PSI, p.22.)  That 
conclusion was consistent with the other presentence evaluations, which recommended 
intensive outpatient treatment as Mr. Lopez would likely benefit from such treatment.  
(PSI, pp.67, 79.)  In fact, as the most recent such evaluation noted, Mr. Lopez 
expressed amenability to that sort of treatment.  (PSI, p.79.)   
Opting for a more rehabilitative alternative at this time was also the better option 
since these were Mr. Lopez’s first felony offenses.  (PSI, pp.4-12.)  As Mr. Lopez had 
explained, he had not been able to get effective treatment previously.  (PSI, p.19.)  In 
dealing with Mr. Lopez’s first felony sentences, the district court had the opportunity to 
provide that sort of treatment through a period of retained jurisdiction.  That alternative 
would allow the district court to assess Mr. Lopez’s ability to effectively participate in 
such a treatment program, and if he was unsuccessful in those efforts, the district court 
could relinquish jurisdiction and execute the prison sentence knowing that all the 
sentencing objectives had been properly addressed.   
To that point, trial counsel explained, “[t]he best way to avoid recidivism as far as 
their IDOC’s [sic] standards would be . . . a retained jurisdiction.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.2-6.)  By 
decreasing the risk of recidivism through treatment, the sentence would also better 
protect society in the long term.  Furthermore, both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized that the timing of rehabilitative programming is 
an important consideration at sentencing.  See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 
(1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489 (Ct. App. 
2008); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988).  Therefore, by rejecting the 
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opportunity to provide timely rehabilitation, the sentence imposed by the district court 
fails to promote two of the goals of sentencing.  As such, it constitutes an abuse of the 
district court’s discretion. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Lopez’s Motion For 
Sentence Reduction 
 
In his motion for the district court to reconsider the sentences, Mr. Lopez 
highlighted several mitigating factors which he contended the district court had 
insufficiently considered.  (R., pp.139-43.)  In regard to one of those factors, trial 
counsel offered additional information, that “Frank has the strong support of his family 
members and friends.”  (R., pp.140-41; compare, e.g., PSI pp.13-15 (discussing 
Mr. Lopez’s family history without going into detail about continuing support).)   
The district court determined that the sentences were appropriate based on the 
fact that Mr. Lopez had a long misdemeanor record and was “reportedly non-compliant 
with the presentence process.”  (R., pp.75, 149.)  Neither of those points actually 
address Mr. Lopez’s arguments in support of his motion – that the district court had not 
given sufficient consideration to the other circumstances, which showed, even in light of 
the points the district court highlighted, the sentences imposed, particularly the decision 
to forego rehabilitative alternatives, did not support the goals of sentencing in this case.  
(See R., pp.140-41.)  Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying the 
motion to reconsider the sentences.  For the reasons articulated in the motion, as well 
as those discussed in Section I, supra, that decision also constituted an abuse of the 
district court’s discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Lopez respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 14th day of January, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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